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 In an increasingly mobile and diverse world, it is difficult to quantify the risk, or danger, 
associated with travelling. Airports have suffered greatly for being unable to define potential 
risks and protect against them. Intelligent adversary risk is a complicated high-level issue for 
many airports. Airports are targeted because of the large amount of people in a confined space 
and the social, economic, and psychological impact of terrorist attacks on the American people. 
In the months following September 11th, 2001, the airline industry in the United States lost $1.1 
billion in revenue. The American people stayed grounded, for fear of another attack by plane. 
Recent airport attacks have had a similar effect. The nearly 350 airport attacks from 2000-2015 
presents a massive opportunity for improvement. The presence of risk, in the form of terrorist 
attacks, is an influential deterrent for passengers. To combat the risk of attack, airports must 
provide a higher level of safety and security to people passing through their terminals. To 
decrease the risk of an attack, airports must increase the ability to defend itself. In the case of 
intelligent adversary attacks, a decrease in risk can be thought of as an increase in value. Multi-
Objective Decision analysis (MODA), uses a Value-Focused Thinking model to quantify value. 
When dealing with human lives, models need to strive to add value not just increase cash flow. 
There are countless projects that could add value, so the selection will be complicated. A 
portfolio analysis will use a budget given by the decision maker and turn it into a set of the 
highest value projects for those dollars. The goal of this study is to canvas the type of solutions 
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 Perception of an impending attack on the United States has increased in the past three 
years.  With crisis in the Middle East, North Korea stocking up on nuclear weapons, and 
continued uncertainty in Europe; many Americans are becoming even more fearful of the future. 
One continued source of fear caused an approximated $1.1 Billion in revenue loss in 2001, due 
to the World Trade Center attacks of September 11th (Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). The 
events of September 11th have caused the United States government to increase airport security 
funding and make it the top priority of the Department of Homeland Security. In addition, almost 
350 terrorist attacks occurred at airports or on airplanes between 2000-2015, as listed by the 
Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database, n.d.). Funding 
levels for airport and airplane security increase have come, seemingly, without a question of the 
value of counter measures being implemented. Placing a value on a human life is difficult, but 
value can be placed on decreasing risk. This study focuses on the best methods to decrease the 
risk of an attack. 
Before 2001, friends and families could walk passengers up to the gate to board a plane. 
Now, there are major security check points, and only passengers can pass through. There is no 
doubt security reform was needed, but reform without oversight to the value per dollar of 
funding does not provide holistic solutions. Questions like, ‘Do the measures being put in place 
actually prevent terrorist attacks from happening’, or ‘Do the added security features make the 
airport, as a whole, safer’ need to be addressed. Viewing airports as a system, instead of a series 
of independent obstacles, has been challenging in the wake of the tremendous losses experienced 
on September 11th. Defining a method for quantifying the ability of a specific technique or tool 
to reduce the risk of terrorist activity in a specific airport is important. The goal of this study is to 
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design a portfolio analysis framework for airports to use in assessing: current value of security, 
possible projects to increase value of security, and given budgetary constraints, what projects 
they should implement. Since putting a dollar value on reduced risk is difficult, a Multiple 
Objective Decision Analysis (MODA) model will be used, along with expert opinion to 
determine value of actions to improve airport security. This methodology helps an airport to see 
the baseline value of current security, and what would be the most beneficial projects or counter 
measures to implement given budgetary requirements. Due to the diverse nature of airport 
security baselines, available alternatives, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
guidelines, each airport will need to change the alternatives, weights, and current state of the 
model. The purpose of the model is to provide a tool to facilitate discussion among airport 
security leadership as to current threats, areas of vulnerability, and possible solutions. 
Background 
 The growth of airport security has been significant over the past 15 years. In 2001, 
security was any person being able to walk up to the gate after passing through a metal detector. 
In 2017, only passengers can pass through security to access the terminals, and they must go 
through full body millimeter wave scanners. At large, often category X airports, passengers are 
randomly picked to provide a swab of their hands to be processed for residue of harmful 
chemicals. Bomb dogs, under-cover agents, and SWAT teams have also become common place 
in large airports around the busy times of year. Airports need a methodology to assess the added 





 Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kaduyali, Daniel Simon consider the cost of employing the 
security agents at a check point (Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). The authors note, it takes 
roughly 15 seconds for the best, 25 seconds for average, and 60 seconds for worst case scenarios 
of a person passing through a security check point. They give the cost of processing 1 million 
average passengers as 1.361 million euros or $1.9 million. This does not include the cost of 
management, equipment, or situations where passengers cause longer than normal delays. If 
these are considered, costs would increase. However, the authors believe the impact of TSA 
security procedures on passengers should be assessed. These security procedures have the 
potential to cut down or increase time severely. The authors also argue a significant amount of 
infractions, 20-40%, go unreported because they are deemed benign (Blalock, Kadiyali, & 
Simon, 2007). If a passenger has negative comments or starts acting aggressive, additional time 
is required to handle the passenger.  
 Stewart and Mueller argue too much emphasis has been put on airport security and not 
enough on the security of the planes (Stewart & Mueller, 2013). They state in their paper on 
Cost-Benefit analysis of airport security that of all terrorist attacks, only .5% are on airports. 
They believe an analysis of prevention begins with the probability of attack. They go on to 
classify assessed security in terms of four threats:  large car bomb, curbside car bomb, luggage or 
vest bomb, and public grounds shooting attack. Stewart and Mueller give several possible fixes 
for these threats and the probability of detecting the threat. They declare the possibility of an 
attack on each major US airport is .2% per year, and the consequences have been relatively 
small. However, there have been several attacks in airports have been very deadly in the past 
four years, including Brussels, Turkey, and Florida. Planes have previously been the main source 
of aviation attacks, but now it has changed to airports (Tuysuz & Almasy, 2016). 
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 Stewart and Mueller based their analysis on a report created by the RAND Corporation. 
The RAND Corporation performed a vulnerability analysis of the Los Angeles airport (LAX) 
and came up with short term solutions to make the airport more secure. The RAND report 
utilizes 11 scenarios they believe canvas the most likely situations an attack could be carried out 
under. Some of these scenarios reflect actual events and some were created to represent possible 
attacks. The report states the desired results are to deter and limit possible damage. RAND 
developed a method for creating threat attack options by looking at the airport components, 
identifying defenses for each attack option, estimating the feasibility of an attack, examining 
historical data, and then compiling these data points. They developed creative and feasible 
alternatives with story lines. Then they binned the 11 scenarios into lists of major and minor 
threats. They identified three major areas to help reduce risk: improving airport processes, 
innovative technology purchases, and new construction projects. They included the costs of the 
projects but did not cross analyze the security value of the project (Figure 1). Cost benefit 





Figure 1:Cost Estimation for LAX Security Improvements (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & Brown, 
2004) 
 
 The security options used to help solve major threats at LAX cover a number of possible 
avenues of attack. However, they did not show the benefit of the alternative or how much value 
is provided by each security option. The most beneficial security options for each of the 11 
categories are shown, but no numerical value is assigned to the option. If the value had been 
assessed, the cost-benefit could be plotted on a graph instead of being put in a table like figure 2. 
This provides little insight into why the alternatives were chosen. (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & 




Figure 2: Cost-Benefit Assessment (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & Brown, 2004) 
 
Rountree and Demetsky used a portfolio model to examine the security measures of 
cargo facilities at airports. They used a survey filled out by major airports to provide a baseline 
analysis of the security systems. Then they determined the feasible alternatives and summarized 
them by cost, what they screen for, time to inspect the baggage, material discrimination, and 
installation type, as shown in figure 3. This knowledge was used, along with a case study of a 
major airport cargo facility, to create a computer simulation of outbound cargo flow through an 
airport facility. The results of the simulation were posted and discussed, but no cost-benefit 
analysis was used to determine the best alternative or an efficient frontier.   
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Figure 3: Alternative Analysis for Roundtree and Demetsky (Rountree & Demetsky) 
 
All four of these papers contribute to the current body of knowledge, and help to lay the 
ground work for the next step. The use of three additional papers, on: X-ray machine 
effectiveness, the training of employees, and the security screen process provide back ground 
information, but do not directly contribute to the knowledge required for modeling.  
The literature review identifies the need for portfolio analysis of airport security 
alternatives. Current papers look at cargo facilities, TSA screening, luggage screening, post-
screening safety, and safety on the ramps. Attackers can often make it through one stage of 
security, but having a multi-layered security portfolio would provide a great increase in total 





Table 1: Airport Security Literature Review Summary 
 
I argue the major flaw with many papers on risk reduction is they do not follow Value-
Focused thinking (VFT) (Parnell, Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013). Their Alternative Focused 
Thinking (AFT) protects against most of the problems, but does not take care of the underlying 
issue of fear. The money lost in the fourth quarter of 2001 was due to fear of another attack. To 
decrease the public sense of fear in airport security, confidence in the whole system must be 
increased. The next step in airport security modeling is to answer the question of how to 
determine the most beneficial outcome for a given budget over a given period. A variable 
portfolio model adjusting for the size and passenger throughput is a practical way to determine 
the necessary level of funding to maintain safety for all passengers. This research focuses on 





Value Model Risk Analysis Value Type
Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon Security Screening - NPV - AFT
Stewart & Mueller Curb to Security - NPV Monte Carlo AFT
RAND Corp Terminal, Cargo, and grounds - Non-Numeric MODA Scenario Analysis AFT
Rountree & Demetsky Cargo Facilities - MODA Simulation AFT
Abidi, Et. Al X-Ray Machine - - - AFT
Gramatica Et Al. Training Employees Linear - - AFT




 To combat the issue of fear among passengers, an atmosphere of safety must be 
cultivated. This paper uses a Value Focused Thinking (VFT) decision analysis methodology. 
VFT considers the ideal situation, and then considers how to best achieve a solution close to the 
ideal. VFT contrasts with Alternative Focused Thinking (ATF). ATF examines the options and 
choses the best option from among them. VFT allows the modeling team to come up with new 
creative solutions. Albert Einstein is famously quoted as stating, “We can’t solve problems by 
using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them” (Mielach, 2012). By defining the 
desired value paramount in the model, the best solution set can be found. The first step is to 
identify the problem, then create a list of stakeholders, a value hierarchy, an influence diagram, a 
list of all possible alternatives, and an evaluation of how much value these alternatives will add. 
Value will be determined by a MODA model with expert insight. This will lead to a portfolio 
analysis of workable solutions to the types of security challenges faced by airports today. We 
know there is no money being directly created by implementing one, or several, of these 
projects; to justify these projects we will consider the potential losses prevented. It is easy to 
justify improvements by looking at the amount of revenue lost by the attacks of September 11th 
(Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). Without attempting to put a value on the nearly 3,000 
priceless lives lost, the $1.1 billion dollars lost to the industry by these tragic events provides 
justification. The Department of Homeland Security received $3.8 billion in Aviation security 
funding in 2015 (Department of Homeland Security, 2015). However, Blalock, et al. have 
claimed a significant amount of aviation security infractions go unnoticed and unreported. It is 
important to minimize the unreported infractions in the most cost-effective way possible, but the 
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focus is not on a particular aspect of the security process, but on providing a complete system to 
deter and defeat attackers.   
 MODA provides a frame work to best allocate aviation security resources to deter an 
attack and, if deterrence fails, to minimize the amount of potential injuries, damage, monetary 
loss among; passengers, personnel, and airports. The reduction of injuries and damage may come 
from the implementation of technology or personnel but cannot simply be assumed. Yearly 
evaluations must be done with the model to determine if the implemented solutions are still 
relevant. After the attacks of September 11th, there was a great increase in security, and a decline 
in injuries and fatalities caused by terrorist attacks. Figure 4 outlines the amount of injuries and 
fatalities over each six-year period, starting in 1968 and ending in 2009 
(http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php). From 2010-2017, the number of injuries and 
fatalities due to attacks is 38 (Johnston, 2017).  
 
Figure 4: Terrorist Attacks in the US, 1968-2009 (http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php) 
 
1968-1973 1974-1979 1980-1985 1986-1991 1992-1997 1998-2003 2004-2009






















Injuries and Fatalities in America
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 There is a spike from 1992-1997 when the airline industry started to grow rapidly. From 
1998-2003, there were 5398 injuries and fatalities, mostly caused by the attack of the World 
Trade Center. The following six years saw relatively few injuries and deaths. In the past three 
years there has been an increase in attacks, a few of the most devastating include airports in 
Brussels and Fort Lauderdale. The attacks from 1998-2003 were by terrorists on airplanes. The 
attacks after 2009 are in the airport terminals and atriums. The next step in defense is to secure 
these areas and provide safety to passengers before going through TSA. 
Decisions & Scope 
 
Risk is difficult to quantify. It is based on knowledge of the motives, knowledge, and 
resources of the attackers. It is difficult to have insight into the objectives and the future methods 
of terrorist organizations can be very difficult to predict. It is hard to protect against unknown 
threats, especially with large, target rich environments such as airports. It is impossible to 
completely mitigate all risk. For this study, we will focus on four types of alternatives: 
Personnel, Procedures, Technology, and Awareness to mitigate risk and increase security. In the 
case of airport security, value can be thought of as the potential reduction of risk to passengers, 
airport personnel, and the infrastructure. This is described in the decision hierarchy (Parnell, 
Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013) found in figure 5. The Decision Hierarchy contains three 
categories of decisions: Done deals, In Scope, and Future Decisions. Done deals are decisions 
made prior to the start of the modeling process, and cannot be changed. Future decisions are 
things beyond the scope of the decision. Future decisions are part of the future research section. 







Figure 5: Decision Hierarchy for Airport Security Improvements 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), and the Department of Transportation regulations are out of the scope of this paper. 
Safety and security of passengers and airport personnel, once they board a plane is also out of 
scope. Similarly, if a security event happens, the response and how to fix the problem should be 
considered for future work. It will focus solely on the items that can be implemented before a 
threat occurs. Methods for diagnosing the type of security event are included in the scope, but the 
initiation of a response to the event is not. The In Scope decisions are suggestions to the decision 
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maker, and are to facilitate a discussion between the decision maker and their staff to help select 
the best portfolio of security options. It is the decision makers’ ultimate responsibility to make 
sure the stakeholders are safe. To assist the decision makers, and to focus this project, a 
stakeholder identification matrix, can be found in table 1. A Stakeholder Issue Identification 
matrix helps the decision maker to understand the parties involved and their concerns (Parnell, 
Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013).  
 
Table 2: Stakeholder Identification Matrix 
 
 The decision maker is the head of airport security. He has several diverse groups of 
stakeholders to take into account, and his main concerns are security, cost, and media attention. 
Airports are particularly sensitive to the news media because they are a business and rely on 
public trust to operate. Each of the stakeholders rely on the others, and they are influenced by 
each-other’s actions. These interactions can prove to be significant. Passengers who become 
panicked during an attack will complicate the exfiltration process by the TSA officials. 
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To understand what the effect of a given implementation, we need to see what people, 
processes, and events influence each other. The use of an influence diagram, in figure 6, will 
help identify the interdependencies. In this case, we will use a System Risk-Actions-
Management, SAM, model to show which factors, decisions, and risks influence each other or 
have some level of relevance. The SAM model shows what particular pieces are management 
focused and people focused.  
 
Figure 6: SAM Model for Airport Security 
 
SAM models include management/system influences, decisions and actions to be taken, 
and risks/probabilistic analysis (Murphy & Pate-Cornell, The SAM Framework: Modeling the 
Effects of Management Factors on Human Behavior in Risk Analysis, 1996). The 
probabilistically determined events are listed apart from the decisions and actions to show top 
level management what is relavent to the situation. This is particularly important in this situation, 
(Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). The four decisions and actions come from the decision 
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hierarchy. They are the four things management can do to have an impact on the security of the 
terminal: Technology, Awareness, Procedures, and Personnel. 
In the case of Airport Security, the Management/System problems are management 
involvement in the security process and proper training. Does the management take an interest in 
what is happening in daily operations? For proper training, are the security agents given proper 
training, then updated training, and recertification? These factors set the tone for the 
organization. The Decisions and Actions level includes Technology, Awareness, Procedures, and 
Personnel.  
Technology includes a variety of systems: computer based, physical, and sensors. This 
includes everything from a new biometric scanner for employees, to concrete barricades that 
prevent cars from driving into the airport. These are the type of improvements that have 
historically been implemented to increase security for airports. Body scanners and mass 
spectrometers are just two examples of personnel screening systems currently in use. Each 
airport in the world, and subsequently each of the terminals, will have unique needs. The systems 
will be highly dependent on the current state of the airport and their budget. This study attempts 
to cover the possibilities, not provide a comprehensive list of options.  
Examples of Personnel are more TSA agents in the security screening lines, police 
officers with bomb dogs, or undercover agents patrolling the airport. Each of these types of 
personnel provides increased security and some even provide a feeling of safety for passengers. 
They contribute to the overall value of deterrent by providing visible, physical security.  
The third and fourth decision are awareness and Procedures. These include, but is not 
limited to, the signage in security lines to inform passengers of the proper techniques to passing 
16 
 
through security seamlessly. A second application of these decision would be posting signs 
related to the other types of security used by airports: Geiger counters, undercover agents, and 
video surveillance. The cost of processing passengers who are confused is high (Kirschenbaum, 
2013). The larger problem is having a significant amount of people standing in one area. Large 
clusters of people make an obvious area of attack for potential terrorists. The RAND report 
focused on increasing value by taking measures to decrease the amount of people standing in 
long lines (Stevens, Hamilton, Mesic, & Brown, 2004). This will also include the procedures 
posted for airport employees, and signs noting the increase in systems security.  
 The probabilistic and risk components to this are many, but they also stem from 
the general idea that the probability of an attack is based on the system, new potential systems, 
and the adversary’s knowledge of these systems. Do potential terrorists know how to penetrate 
them, or do they know that the airport’s defense system is robust enough to prevent the major of 
attacks, and will thus be less likely to attack? Therefore, a system’s effectiveness is uncertain, 
but can be improved by proper modeling and implementation. The final thing to note is the 
probability of detection of an attack. The probability of detecting a gun in a security is not as 
high as the 31% it used to be, but the techniques used by Abidi, et al. in 2006 were still only 
56.5-69.5% effective in closing the gap (Abidi, Zheng, Gribok, & Abidi, 2006).  
The density of people in the atrium and the attacks knowledge of it, bring relevant 
consequences to the discussion when looking at the loss level. These factors work towards 





Figure 7: Value Hierarchy for Airport Security 
 
The value hierarchy shows how airport security improvements can generate value by 
improving on one of these four functions: Increase Public Awareness of Security, Demonstrate 
Deterrent, Control Access, and Monitor Response. Functions are verb-noun phrases that describe 
categories the decision makers should consider when planning to increase value. They represent 
four distinct areas of value, but alternatives are not binned by function, rather alternatives can 
add value to each of these four functions if they have broad impact. These four functions map to 
objectives for improvement. Objectives are specific things which can be maximized or 
minimized to increase value. For example, to Control Access, we must minimize unsupervised 
access point. Value measures are the numerical way to determine how much value is provided by 
that objective. All the decisions/actions from our SAM model should help to maximize or 
minimize one or more of these objectives by increasing the numerical value. The benefit in our 





The scope of the value model can be found in the value hierarchy. The value hierarchy 
begins with the purpose of the research, and then gives four functions to optimize; each of the 
objectives under the four functions is a minimization or a maximization item. To increase value, 
we must maximize or minimize those objectives by decreasing or increasing the value measure 
for that specific objective.  
 Defining what adds value is a difficult problem. Value is not explicitly seen. If additional 
security systems are added to a small, low risk airport, has value been added? If a system is 
added to Jackson-Hartfield in Atlanta, the busiest airport in the world, but it does not prevent an 
attack, did it add value? In the field of decision analysis, value is defined differently by most 
experts. The general principle of value is that it is a measurable way of telling how close you are 
to achieving your goal. For airport security, our goal is to have 100% of the passengers passing 
through the airport, get from the front doors of the departing airport to the moment they get on 
the plane. That encompasses the atrium, security check-points, post security, and the ramp to get 
on the plane. In figure 5, in the past five years, we have seen many attacks at airports targeting 
passengers, employees, and non-passengers before the security check-points. The value model 
focuses on potential for decreasing the risk of attack before the security check-point.  
 The value model takes a set of alternatives, scores them using the value measures, and 
produces a numerical result of the improvement in value. A value measure has two components; 
the independent input, x, and a dependent value score for the input, v(x). Five data points are 
recorded, using subject matter experts to determine the independent and dependent values. The 
value score must have the first point at 0, and the last point at 100. These values give the model a 
minimum input to incur any value, and a maximum input to receive the most value. This can be 
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seen in figure 8. The name of the value measure is Visible Security Resources per Terminal. If 
there are no visible resources in a terminal, then no value is incurred. If there are 20 visible 
security resources in the terminal, then 100 value points are incurred. If more than the maximum 
amounts of visible resources are present, then no additional value is incurred.   
 
Figure 8: Value Measure Calculation 
 
 The value measure calculations are used to determine the amount of value achieved by 
the level of the input variable, x. For any level of resources, the amount of value can be 
interpolated between the points using a macro, ValuePL. The amount of value per visible 
resource can be graphed, and the shape of the curve provides additional insight into the measure. 
In figure 9, we see the shape of the curve is concave. We can interpret this as having a view 
visible resources per terminal significantly increases the value. Half of the value for this measure 
can be received if four visible security resources are present in the terminal. To achieve the other 
half of the value, an additional 16 resources must be implemented. This information is vital to a 
decision maker who must consider both value and budget.  The shape of the curve was obtained 












Figure 9: Visible Security Resources per Terminal Value Curve 
 
 The value measure, Visible Resources per Terminal is part of the Demonstrate Deterrent 
Function, and only displays the value for a specific measure. Each of the alternatives has a value 
score for this measure. This model has 12 alternatives. Each of the alternatives has a primary 
area of value, function. They can provide additional value to other functions, but it is secondary. 
The alternatives are the implementation options the decision maker can fund. This value 
functions assess the value for each value measure, but does not explain how important each value 
measure is to the overall value.  
How important are each of those objectives to the overall goal of the research is a 
question which keeps decision analysts divided. There are two main philosophies on how to 
weigh the objectives. For both processes, the subject matter experts are asked for input. The 
Analytical Hierarchy Process, developed by Dr. Saaty, is a process by which the relative 
importance of an objective is the measure of how important it is compared to the other objectives 
(Saaty). The subject matter experts are asked to a series of pairwise comparison questions in 
which they are asked to determine which objective is more important. This process has the 













Visible Security Resources per Terminal
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the experts have a specific project or alternative they favor, they are likely to weigh all other 
alternatives or projects to be less important than that. This bias will discredit the importance of 
every other project, to save the subject matter expert’s favorite. The aggregation of many subject 
matter expert’s opinions will only dilute the model.  
The second weighting technique is the swing weight matrix. This technique allows the 
subject matter experts to provide an unnormalized weight for each value measure, fi, (Parnell, 
Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013) based on the importance and the variation of the value 
measure. Independent scoring allows for a reduction in motivation and cognitive bias by 
removing the competitive nature of ratings. Once they are each scored, the score of the value 
measure is divided by the sum of all scores, ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , to get the normalized weights. By providing 
normalized weights, it is easy to see how important to the overall value of the project, a specific 
objective is.  






Equation 1: Swing Weight Calculation 
 
If the weights, wi, are summed by objective, each function can be shown to represent a 
certain amount of the total normalized value. Using a swing weight matrix allows decision 
makers to see how important each function is to the overall value by summing the weights of 
each value measure for that function.  Figure 10 shows the unnormalized weights in the yellow 




Figure 10: Airport Security Swing Weight Matrix 
 
 Swing weights are based on two distinct criteria: Importance and Need for improvement. 
An alternative could include room for improvement, but not be important to improve. For 
example, an airport could have no plan for a nuclear attack, but the probability a nuclear strike 
will happen to an airport is very low. Nuclear attacks would rank very high on need for 
improvement, but very low on the importance for improving. Being able to rank objectives in 
terms of both importance and need for improvement helps the decision maker identify the 
immediate needs, and the more long-term planning items.  
 The importance of a value measure is found using swing weights, and the value of an 
alternative, for each of the value measures, can be found using the value curve and interpolating 
from the 5 points in the value function. By combining these two pieces we can find the weighted 
value of each alternative for each value measure. Table 3 shows the transformation of the score 
for each alternative on Visible Resources per Terminal to value to weighted value.  
fi wi fi wi fi wi




Percent of People that 
have heard of system
70 0.17
Percent of People that 
have heard of system
30 0.07
Response Time in Minutes 60 0.14
Adequacy of Response 35 0.08
Access Control 40 0.10
Consequences of Improving Measures












Safety of all Airport Personnel
Swing  






Table 3: Weighted Value Calculation for Visible Security Resources per Terminal 
 
Equation 2 displays the mathematical reasoning for determining the weighted value of an 
alternative for each of the value measures. The weighted value, V(x), is equal to the sum of each 
swing weight, wi, times the value, vi, of score, xi. A simplified explanation of V(x) is, the total 
amount of value for each alternative. 




Equation 2: Additive Value Model 
 
 
 The current Baseline line in table 3 shows the score, value, and weighted value for the 
current state of security in the chosen terminal. The entire portfolio line shows the maximum 
amount of value possible to attain given the current set of alternatives. Finally, the ideal is the 
amount of value possible to attain for the given value measure. Visible Security Resources per 
























Back Up Power Generator
Mobile Geiger Counter












Additional Signage in Airport












the decision maker part of the picture, but the cost data is needed. The basis for the costs of each 




 When choosing to evaluate a set of projects, a decision maker has several quantitative 
methods available: Return on Investment (ROI), Cost-Benefit, Portfolio models, etc. Economic 
models such as ROI is a good method for problems where all the value can be turned into 
dollars. Places like manufacturing and sales can calculate the ROI on hiring more employees or 
using more expensive materials. The two major types of models to use cost and value are cost-
benefit ratios and portfolio analysis with optimization.  
 Cost-benefit ratios pick projects by a simple ratio of benefits to cost. Cost-Benefit rations 
do not allow for addition constraints and assume independence among projects. In an 
optimization model the maximum value for a budget will be found. This research uses portfolio 
analysis with optimization. Figure 11 shows the model. Each of the alternatives from our value 
model are listed with the associated annual costs. The current state of airport terminal security is 
the input into the baseline column. A score of 1 designates that the airport uses the alternative in 
part of its daily operations, and a score of 0 designates that the alternative is not in daily use. The 
decision column utilizes the same scoring technique, and is used to add value to the baseline. The 
last four columns are the value added by deciding to, or not to, select an alternative.  
 The value accumulated for each function cannot surpass the total value of that function 
for the entire portfolio. The value for each of the functions using all alternatives in the portfolio 
is shown in red at the bottom of the table, and is taken from the value model. The total value for 
all functions is summed at the bottom middle of the table. The total cost is the sum of the costs 
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for the decisions with a score of 1. The constraint for total cost is show directly below the sum of 
costs in the red cell.  
 
Figure 11: Portfolio Model for Airport Security 
  
 The portfolio model finds the set of optimal solutions. Depending on the funding level of 
the decision maker or the desired value a set of alternatives can be recommended. The efficient 
frontier technique will be used to create a set of solutions for varying funding levels. portfolio 
analysis gives the decision maker the most freedom to choose what they believe to be the optimal 
value for each funding level. The mathematical objective and constraints for the optimization 








Equation 3: Maximization of Total Value 
 
Project Alternatives Cost Decision Baseline
Increase Public 
Awareness of Security 
Added Value
Demonstrate 







Additional Signage in 
Airport
$750k 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P2
Publication of Security 
Features




$1,000k 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P4 Bomb Dogs $750k 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P5 Police Officers $500k 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P6 Under Cover Agents $1,000k 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00




$750k 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P9 CO2 Sensors $500k 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P10
Back Up Power 
Generator
$1,000k 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P11 Mobile Geiger Counter $750k 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P12 Surveillance Robot $500k 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Cost $3.50m Total Value 76.86 17 22 13 25
Constraint $4.50m 17 26 21 25
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Equation 4: Cost Constraint 
 
𝑦𝑗 =  {
0               𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑
1                      𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 
  
  Equation 5: Decision Funding Set 
 
Equation 3 states the goal of the optimization model to be the maximization of the total 
value of the portfolio. Maximizing the amount of value for a given dollar value allows us to find 
the upper limit of value, while constraining the cost. This method, replicated for range of 
budgets, will give the efficient frontier. Equation 4 states the sum of all costs, Ci, times the 
decision variable, yj, cannot be greater than the Budget, B. Setting a budget allows the decision 
maker to put in his budget and create an optimal portfolio. Equations 5 lists the set of values Yj 
can be. If the alternative is funded then a 1 is selected, and if it is not funded then a zero is 
selected 
Insights 
 The value to the decision maker of having a tool to diagnose areas of improvement large 
is beneficial. Use of the same tool to assess the value of alternatives with the cost of providing 
the alternatives increases the viability of the tool. In this section we consider the current state of 
airport security of DFW terminal D, using an expert’s opinions. Actual data provides a security 




 The purpose of looking at the current state is to find areas of strength and areas of growth 
for the security team in Terminal D. We will evaluate each based on the four functions of 
security shown in the value hierarchy: Increase Public Awareness of Security, Demonstrate 
Deterrent, Control Access, and Monitor Response. Each area will receive an overall value, and 
also a value for each of its objectives. These scores come from value of the current security 
features. Figure 11 showed the alternatives which DFW utilizes on a regularly recurring basis: 
publication of security features, bomb dogs, police officers, atrium surveillance, backup power 
generators, and a mobile Geiger counter.  
 The Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW) airport publishes some of security features in 
white papers and other public outlets. They also regularly use teams of bomb dogs to sweep the 
terminals, and police officers for additional security presence. DFW has atrium surveillance and 
a backup power generator to keep security features active in case of power outages. Each feature 
does not add the same amount of value to the model, so it is important to know which features 
are key components. Figure 12 is an Alternative value component chart. It shows the amount of 




Figure 12: Alternative Value Component Chart 
 
 Along the bottom of the chart, all the alternatives are listed. The y-axis of the chart 
represents how much value, from the value model, is assessed for each measure. Visually, it is 
easy to tell that minimize Unsupervised Access Points and Maximize Public Awareness are both 
prevalent in the alternatives. Minimize Uncovered area and Maximize adequacy of response are 
both more scarce than the other alternatives. The decision maker will want to pay special 
attention to the value measures associated with those objectives because of the scarcity of 
solutions.  
 We can also see bomb dogs, randomizing security features, police officers, and 
surveillance robots provide the most value as alternatives. This follows logically with what we 
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know about effect of security personnel on the potential for attacks. Terrorist’s seek out easy 
targets, and do not attack robust defense systems. The more visible security forces, the more 
robust a system.   
 From the graph we can also see the value of the current baseline compared with the entire 
portfolio and the ideal. The baseline provides 77 points of value, and the idea value is 100. The 
amount of value that can be achieved is the value score for the entire portfolio, and has a score of 
89. The difference between the ideal and the entire portfolio is called the value gap. This is the 
amount of value that cannot be achieved with the current technology, resources, and system 
knowledge. The gap can close, but it will require a more complex understanding of the threats 
posed to the terminal, and advanced knowledge of the methods the attackers will use to cause 
harm. Given the security features, we can estimate the cost of security to be $3.5 million dollars 
per year. To provide additional value, we must either optimize the current portfolio, or suggest 
addition value for additional funding.  
Future State 
 The current spending cost is estimated at $3.5 million dollars. If the decision maker 
decides to keep these estimated costs and the 77 value points, we must provide additional levels 
of funding. To create the efficient frontier, we will vary the funding level by $.5 million 
increments and plot the cost vs. value. Figure 13 details the value of adding projects to the 
current baseline.  
 The greatest increase in value, over the baseline, comes from half million dollars in 
support. By adding $.5 million, in the form of a surveillance robot, almost 7 points of value are 
added. The second level of funding adds CO2 sensors to the security protocol. The third level of 
funding adds undercover agents, but removes the CO2 sensors. The addition of $2.5 million, 
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includes; robotic surveillance, CO2 sensors, and undercover agents. Any additional funding, after 
$2.5 million, does not increase value. The maximum system value has been achieved, for a total 
of $5.5 million.  
 The second option is a partial overhaul of the baseline to optimize dollars spent. To do 
this, we will vary the baseline funding from $1.5 million to $5.5 million to find the efficient 
frontier.   
The new proposed baseline ramps up value more quickly than the current baseline. At 
$3.5 million in funding, the new baseline has 87 value points, while the current only has 77. The 
flaw of many airport security tests is the testing of attributes individually. Potential attackers 
must beat a series of systems, not just one step. By looking at the steps as a whole, and using our 
knowledge of swing weights to focus on measures that add value, not redundancy, we can 
increase the value of the system and decrease the cost. 
 






















Value vs. Funding Level
New Baseline Value Old Baseline Value
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By letting the simulation pick the alternatives to implement, we maximize the value for a set 
budget.  The new baseline alternative is independent of the current regulatory scheme, but 
provides a case for a restructuring of regulations. For a budget of $2.5 million, terminal D would 
receive Bomb Dogs, Police Officers, and Atrium Video Surveillance. Table 4 shows the ramping 
of value for the new proposed and current baseline.  
 
Table 4 New vs. Current Baseline 
 
 Restructuring the current set of security features could save money and provide more 
value. For $2.5 million, Terminal D could have more than 6 additional points in value, and 
would save $1 million dollars annually. The restructuring would take time and effort, on the part 
of senior management, but the airport would benefit in both dollars and value.  
 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
 There are hundreds of commercial airports in the United States, and even more aboard. 
Each airport will bring its own unique challenges, security concerns, and current baseline. The 
weighting of the objectives, pricing of alternatives, and value of alternatives can change 












significantly, depending on the situation. Taking into account variable situations is one of the 
most difficult tasks of decision makers. Planning is done to diminish the amount of surprises and 
unexpected costs, but there will still be variation in any situation. To best consider variation, 
Monte Carlo simulation will be used. Monte Carlo simulation lets the modeler define the 
distribution, parameters, and number of randomized simulations. By quantifying the uncertain 
inputs and calculating the uncertain value and cost, a fuller picture is provided to the decision 
maker. The decision maker will understand the potential for failure, and the best way to protect 
against catastrophic failure.  
  For this simulation we will vary 3 things: cost of alternatives and swing weights. 
Varying the swing weights allows the decision maker to see how much variation could be caused 
if the subject matter experts perceived value is incorrect. Understanding the variation caused by 
the swing weights helps the decision maker to know how robust their decision is. Monte Carlo 
simulation uses random number generation to create an n’th number of trials. The distribution 
and parameters are set by the modeler, and the number generator creates trials to follow the 
distribution. In most cases, a triangular distribution can be used for inputs. The triangular 
distribution is useful because it requires only a min, most likely, and max, and roughly 
approximates several distributions.  
 Next, the swing weights are varied from 1 to 100, and the most likely value will be the 
value assigned by subject matter experts. Costs will be varied notionally, considering: ease of 
access, commonality of use, complexity of the system, propensity to break, and difficulty to 
replace. 1000 trials were used to add strength to simulation, and provide width of use. This 
simulation shows the distribution of cost and value for the current baseline.  
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 Figure 15 shows the distribution of value brought by the variation of the swing weights 
and value measures. The graph is roughly, normally distributed with a mean of 72.18. The 
deterministic value, 76.86, found earlier, is larger than the probabilistic value of 72.18. The value 
of 76.86 was found by using expert assessment of the value curves and the weights of the value 
measures. The probabilistic value takes into account the worst possible situations, as well as the 
most likely, and the best. Human beings tend to ignore the worst-case scenario. The standard 
deviation for this distribution is 4.95 points. We can say with 95% confidence, from this 
distribution, the value of the baseline system is between 63.8 and 80.0.  
 
Figure 13: Value Histogram of Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
 Similarly, the cost of the current systems can be estimated using Monte Carlo simulation. 
The costs of each of the alternatives are estimated, using low, expected, and high-costs, and run 
through the simulation. Figure 16 contains the results of the cost simulation. The cost distribution 
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shown, is the amount of funding required to achieve the baseline value of 77 points. These two 
figures come together to create a two-dimensional surface representing the cost and value of the 
baseline. This two-dimensional surface allows the decision maker to see the full realm of 
possibilities for the current baseline.  
 
Figure 14:Cost Histograms of Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
 After seeing the 16 point variance between the upper and lower bounds of the confidence 
interval, the decision maker will want to see what caused the variation. A tornado diagram is a 
bar graph that visibly shows the amount of variation each variable contributes to the over all 





Figure 15: Tornado Diagram for Variation in Value 
 
 The top bar on the tornado diagram shows the minimum and maximum value of the total 
system when Percent of People that have heard of the System is changed from 1 to 100 in the 
swing weight matrix. By itself, Percent of People that have heard of system, can vary the value 
13 points. Access control, however, can only vary the value 2 points. If a particular swing weight 
is scored higher by the subject matter expert, then the relative value of the other swings weights 
will decrease. The weighting of the system highly favors knowledge as a preventative measure. 
Knowledge is important asset for the TSA. They believe the most value can be incurred by 
terrorists knowing the great amount of preparation that goes into building defense systems.  
Summary 
 The need for airport security is evident in our daily news. There are airport attacks 
several times a year, and the attacks have evolved. Our airports have tightened security for areas 
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of previous attack, but to save lives a more holistic approach must be taken. Airport security can 
no longer be a series of groups operating independently of each other. The security team must be 
rigorous and unified. TSA, FBI, airport security, and police forces must operate in conjunction 
with one another to patrol the entire airport. Having red team testing of individual units helps 
that unit, but terminals will only become more secure if security measures are stacked together to 
form a chain of measures. It is much harder for a team of attackers to pass by a layered defense. 
This study provides a format for quantifying the value for each step in the process. The curb to 
ramp scope allows for law enforcement total control, where in the past attackers have thrived in 
atriums and on curbs.  
 The format of the model allows for decision makers to assign values to the swing weights 
to emphasize areas of growth for a terminal, while maintaining the rigor needed for a robust 
model. The benefit for a security team is to work through the model and understand the approach 
of defining goals, breaking the goals into objectives, providing a way to quantify those goals, and 
then rating the alternatives in terms of the value of towards those goals. The value of Monte 
Carlo simulation affords a decision maker the ability to understand the impact of uncertainties on 
value. The value can change if there are changes to the infrastructure, TSA procedures, and state 
of the nation. By reassessing the state of security once a year, the airport will be able to maintain 
value. Table 4 summarizes the results of model. If an additional $1 million dollars in funding is 
added to the current portfolio, 14 points of value can be added for a total of 89 value points. If, 
however, the terminal was to start over, assuming no initial resources, 89 value points could be 
achieved using the current estimated budget of $3.5 million.  
 There are a few concepts which are outside of the scope of this project. This project 
utilized an additive value methodology, and assumes the value added by each project is 
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independent on the other projects chosen. Investigating the possibility of having dependent 
values and how to model them is a piece of future research. As previously mentioned, the 
regulations placed by TSA and DHS restrict the range of possible portfolios, and dictate the 
current baseline. If the baseline could be changed, due to a change one regulation, or a group of 
regulations, the shadow price of the regulation or regulations, could be found. Also, anything 
involving the security of parking garages, roads leading into the airport and the tarmac are 
outside of the scope, and would require further analysis.  
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Swing Weight of Visible Security Resources per 
Terminal
Calculation of alternative score
Ideal
Entire Portfolio
The number of resources per terminal is defined as the number of 
units of police officers, bomb dogs, and security robots present in 
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The value curve is concave. This is because 




























































The percentage of passengers and non-employee 
occupents in the terminal who have heard of the 
security system being implemented at that airport. 
Calculation of alternative score
The value curve is concave. This is because potential 
attackers will do research to have knowledge of 











Additional Signage in Airport 8
Swing Weight of Percent of People that 
have heard of system
Absolute Score Swing Weight (wi)
90
Police Officers 10
Under Cover Agents 0
Mass Spectrometer 4
Current Baseline 20
Publication of Security Features 8
Randomization of Security Features 11
Bomb Dogs 10
Mobile Geiger Counter
Atrium Video Surveillance 4
CO2 Sensors 0




Function Increase Public Awareness of Security
Value Measures Percent of People that have heard of system
Natural or Constructed:`
Source for Scale:





















































Swing Weight of Percent of coverage of 
Airport
Calculation of alternative score
The percentage of square footage in a terminal that 







Back Up Power Generator 0
Mobile Geiger Counter 0
Under Cover Agents 1
Mass Spectrometer 0
Atrium Video Surveillance 1




Additional Signage in Airport
Value Curve
Score Value of Score
x v(x)
0
Publication of Security Features 0





Function Demonstrate Deterrent 
Value Measures Percent of coverage of Airport
Natural or Constructed: Value Curve Shape:The value curve is convex. This is because 
attackers will aim for the weakest spot, and 
less than total coverage affords them the 
opportunities
Source for Scale:

























































Swing Weight of Response Time in Minutes
Calculation of alternative score
The time, in minutes, elapsed between an incident 




Back Up Power Generator 1
Mobile Geiger Counter 0
Surveillance Robot 1
2Current Baseline
Under Cover Agents 1
Mass Spectrometer 0
Atrium Video Surveillance 2




Additional Signage in Airport 0
Publication of Security Features 0









Value Measures Response Time in Minutes
Natural or Constructed:` Value Curve Shape:
The value curve is negative linear. This is 
because each minute of extra minute in 
response time is weighted equally
Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion
Value Curve























































It takes longer than 5 minutes for the 
resources to arrive
Within 15 seconds, right personnel and 
resources
The right personnel and resources arrive 
within 1 minute
The right personnel and resources arrive 
within 2 minutes
The right personnel and resources arrive 
within 5 minutes






Back Up Power Generator 0
Mobile Geiger Counter 0
Under Cover Agents 3
Mass Spectrometer 0
Atrium Video Surveillance 3




Additional Signage in Airport 0
Publication of Security Features 0
Swing Weight of Adequacy of Response





The value curve is convex. This is because a 
low accuracy of response can lead to 
significant damages.
Source for Scale:
Notional and Expert Opinion
Value Curve





Value Measures Adequacy of Response





















































It detects breach attempts and denies access less 
than 95% of the time.
It detects breach attempts and denies access 95% of 
the time.
It detects breach attempts and denies access 100% 
of the time.
It detects breach attempts, denies access, and sends 
a notification.
It detects breach attempts, denies access, sends a notification, fail 







Back Up Power Generator 2
Mobile Geiger Counter 2
Under Cover Agents 6
Mass Spectrometer 2
Atrium Video Surveillance 4




Additional Signage in Airport 0
Publication of Security Features 0
Swing Weight of Access Control









Value Measures Access Control
Natural or Constructed:` Value Curve Shape:The value curve is conc v . This is 
because the visible presence of a few 
resources is a discouragement to 
attackers.
Source for Scale:



















































Calculation of alternative score
Swing Weight of Unmanned Access Points
60 0.17
7
Publication of Security Features
7
Atrium Video Surveillance 7




Additional Signage in Airport
7
Absolute Score Swing Weight (wi)
CO2 Sensors 7
Back Up Power Generator 7
Mobile Geiger Counter 7










Natural or Constructed:` Value Curve Shape:
The value curve is concave. This is because 
the visible presence of a few resources is a 
discouragement to attackers.
Source for Scale:




Score Value of Score
x
Function Control Access
Value Measures Unmanned Access Points
Count of the number of unmanned access points in 































Sending the right personel to a problem sight is important
Quicker responses prevent catastrophic problems
Knowledge of defense systems is a deterent for terrorists
Full Over sight of the airport leads to quick reactions
The greatest deterent is a show of force
Controling access prevents terrorists from entering
Unmanned access points are likely targets for terrorists
Visible Security Resources per Terminal
Percent of coverage of Airport
Percent of People that have heard of system
Response Time in Minutes
Adequacy of Response
Access Control
Visible Security Resources per Terminal
Percent of coverage of Airport
Percent of People that have heard of system





Rationale for Value Measure Position
Percent of coverage of Airport
Response Time in MinutesAdequacy of Response
Percent of People that have 
heard of system
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